

INTRODUCTION

Smart grids use Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) to collect high-resolution electricity consumption data. ML models classify usage patterns as benign or malicious to detect electricity theft in near real-time.

Electricity theft causes losses of up to \$6 billion annually in the US & Canada. While smart meters reduce physical theft, they introduce new cyber vulnerabilities — particularly data-poisoning attacks where mislabelled samples shift decision boundaries and degrade detection.

"Most detectors implicitly assume correctly labelled training data — a critical weakness exploited by adversarial data-poisoning."

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

RQ1. How does data poisoning quantitatively affect shallow and deep theft detection models?

RQ2. Do deep learning architectures show greater inherent robustness vs. classical ML?

RQ3. Can ensemble-based mitigation significantly reduce robustness degradation?

RQ4. What trade-offs exist between robustness and computational complexity?

Hypotheses: **H1:** DR degrades **H2:** Deep>Shallow **H3:** Ensemble Δ

LITERATURE REVIEW

- Jokar et al. [1] — ML outperforms rule-based detection in AMI networks
 - Jindal et al. [2] — SVM & Decision Trees effective but feature-sensitive
 - Ismail et al. [5] — GRU-RNNs capture temporal correlation; improved accuracy
 - Takiddin et al. [4] — first systematic poisoning study; DR drop up to 17%
 - Zhu et al. [7] — hybrid-order features; adversarial resilience not analysed
 - Dietterich [9] — ensemble methods reduce variance, improve generalisation
- Research Gap: No study provides structured Δ benchmarking across poisoning levels comparing shallow ML and deep learning simultaneously.

THE DATA

Irish Smart Energy Trial Dataset (Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland)


3,000
Residential units
25,000
Records/customer

18 mo
Timespan
30 min
Read interval

METHODOLOGY

- Data prep — Irish Smart Energy Trial; ADASYN balancing; zero-mean unit-variance scaling
- Poisoning sim — label-flipping at 0%, 10%, 20%, 30% controlled penetration
- Baselines — Random Forest, AdaBoost, SVM (shallow) + GRU, AEA (deep)
- Ensemble — Averaging vs. Sequential (AEA → GRU → FC Layer)
- Optimisation — Sequential grid search: layers, neurons, optimisers, dropout
- Evaluation — DR, FA, Precision, F1, AUC-ROC + Δ = (Clean - Poisoned)


ATTACK PIPELINE



SEQUENTIAL ENSEMBLE ARCHITECTURE



DETECTION RATE VS. POISONING LEVEL



KEY FINDINGS [4]

95.2% Sequential ensemble DR — stable under all poisoning levels

17% Max DR degradation in benchmarks at 30% poisoning

1–3% Sequential ensemble Δ vs. 13–17% for all benchmarks

+12% Deep learning advantage over shallow ML in clean conditions

This research extends [4] by formal Δ robustness metric, structured benchmarking at 0/10/20/30% poisoning, and computational complexity trade-off analysis for AMI.

TECHNOLOGIES

Python	TensorFlow	Keras	scikit-learn
NumPy	pandas	Jupyter	GitHub

EXPECTED CONTRIBUTIONS

- Reproducible Δ robustness benchmarking framework for smart grid ML
- Systematic evaluation of shallow ML vs. deep learning at 0–30% poisoning
- Ensemble mitigation strategy with quantified robustness improvement
- Computational complexity trade-off analysis for real AMI deployment

REFERENCES

- Jokar et al. IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol.7, no.1, 2016
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